# Behaviourism — Lecture Notes #psychology #behaviourism #philosophy-of-science --- ## Core Operant Conditioning Concepts |Term|Definition| |---|---| |**Reinforcer**|Increases the likelihood/frequency of a behaviour| |**Punisher**|Decreases the likelihood/frequency of a behaviour| |**Extinction**|Behaviour decreases when reinforcement is removed| |**Shaping**|Successive approximations toward a target behaviour| |**Fading**|Gradual removal of prompts/supports| |**Chaining**|Linking a sequence of behaviours into a complex routine| ### Methods of Behaviour Change - **Capture** — catch or wait to see the behaviour naturally occurring, then reinforce - **Shape** — reinforce existing behaviours that approximate the target - **Lure** — draw out or trade the behaviour with rewards - **Phasing** — systematically decrease behaviours via extinction schedules > 📚 **Expand:** See Skinner, B.F. (1938). _The Behavior of Organisms_; Cooper, Heron & Heward (2020). _Applied Behavior Analysis_ (3rd ed.) for full taxonomy of reinforcement schedules (FR, VR, FI, VI). --- ## Functional Behaviour Assessment (FBA) A systematic process to identify the _function_ of a behaviour — what is maintaining it. **Four functions of behaviour (SEAT):** - **S**ensory / automatic reinforcement - **E**scape / avoidance - **A**ttention - **T**angible / access to preferred items > 📚 **Expand:** O'Neill et al. (1997). _Functional Assessment and Program Development for Problem Behavior_. Iwata et al. (1982/1994) — foundational analogue FBA study. --- ## Philosophical Critiques of Behaviourism _(Flagged as "less relevant / disregard" in notes — but worth knowing)_ ### David Armstrong - Australian philosopher; identity theorist - Argued mental states = physical brain states (central-state materialism) - **Counterexample to behaviourism:** behaviour alone cannot define mental states > 📚 Armstrong, D.M. (1968). _A Materialist Theory of the Mind_. ### Hilary Putnam — "Why Behaviourism is Wrong" - **X-worlder / X-world argument:** beings behaviourally identical to us but with inverted or absent inner states → behaviourism cannot distinguish them - **Super-Spartans:** beings who experience pain but never show pain behaviour → breaks the behaviour = mental state equation - **Logical constructs problem:** are mental states just logical constructs out of behaviour dispositions? Putnam says no. > 📚 Putnam, H. (1963). Brains and Behavior. In _Analytical Philosophy_, 2nd series. Also see Putnam (1967) on functionalism as the replacement for behaviourism. **Key questions raised:** - How do we determine _pain_ without behaviour as evidence? - Isn't this inherently cross-disciplinary? (philosophy + neuroscience + psychology) - We need to learn more about **verbal behaviour** as a mediating case --- ## Private Events & "Within the Skin" > _"Private events 'within the skin' — feelings and mental states are..."_ Radical behaviourism (unlike methodological behaviourism) **does not deny** private events — it argues they are: - Real events, occurring within the organism - Subject to the same contingencies as public behaviour - Not directly observable but inferable through verbal behaviour **Focus:** Environmental contingencies and reinforcement history explain private events without resorting to mentalism. > 📚 Skinner, B.F. (1945). The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms. _Psychological Review_, 52(4), 270–277. 📚 Skinner, B.F. (1974). _About Behaviorism_. Chapter 2: Feelings and Introspection. --- ## The Agent Problem ### Behaviourism as a Philosophy of Science of Psychology - Behaviourism began as a **philosophy of science** — a methodological commitment to observable, measurable behaviour - Especially influential in **behaviour analysis** (applied and experimental) ### The "Agent" Issue - Is behaviourism **agent-free**? It traditionally avoids positing an inner "agent" or homunculus - Critics: without an agent, how do we account for **intentional action**, **choice**, and **purpose**? ### Adaptive Radiation as an Analogical Process - Behaviourism's spread across different niches (clinical, educational, organisational) is analogous to **adaptive radiation** in evolutionary biology - Different "species" of behaviourism evolved to fit different problem-niches > 📚 **Foxall, G.R. (2008).** Intentional Behaviorism. _Behavior and Philosophy_, 36, 1–55. ← _cited in notes_ ### Criticism from Inside and Outside - **Selective pressure** — competing paradigms (cognitive revolution, neuroscience) challenged behaviourism - Behaviourism adapted or was replaced in different niches --- ## Radical Behaviourism — B.F. Skinner (1945) > _"Radical Behaviour — B.F. Skinner, 1945"_ ### Core Characteristics - **Atheoretical** — avoids hypothetical constructs - **Empirical** — data-driven, experimental - **Pragmatic** — judged by what works, not theoretical elegance ### Types of Behaviour (Skinner's Framework) ``` Behaviour ├── Mechanically (reflexive / respondent) └── Interactively (operant — shaped by consequences) ``` ### Types of Causes / Levels of Analysis |Level|Description| |---|---| |Radical|Direct contingency-behaviour relationship| |Emergent|Properties not reducible to simpler parts| |Theoretical|Hypothetical constructs (avoided in pure behaviourism)| |Teleological|Goal-directed explanation| |Multiscale|Analysis at multiple levels simultaneously| |Molar vs. Molecular|Macro patterns (Rachlin) vs. micro events (Skinner)| |Intentional|Purposive language applied behaviourally (Foxall)| ### Behaviourists on the Unit of Analysis |Theorist|Position| |---|---| |**Skinner**|Molecular — individual responses and contingencies| |**Stevens**|Psychophysical scaling; measurement focus| |**Herrnstein**|Matching law; molar patterns| |**Baum**|Molar behaviourism — extended time patterns matter| |**Rachlin**|Teleological behaviourism — patterns over time define behaviour| ### Cognition, State, Organism, Person, N/A - These represent levels or loci of behavioural analysis - Mechanically ↔ Interactively distinction maps onto respondent ↔ operant > 📚 Skinner, B.F. (1945). The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms. 📚 Rachlin, H. (1994). _Behavior and Mind: The Roots of Modern Psychology_. 📚 Baum, W.M. (2017). _Understanding Behaviorism_ (3rd ed.). --- ## Key Metaphor > _"The organism is the medium of behaviour, as water is to chemical reaction"_ — Skinner / Stevens / Herrnstein This captures radical behaviourism's view: the organism is **not the cause** of behaviour but the **medium through which** environmental contingencies produce behaviour. The real causes are in the history of reinforcement and the current environment. --- ## Concept Map (Mermaid Graph) ```mermaid graph TD A[Behaviourism] --> B[Methodological Behaviourism] A --> C[Radical Behaviourism - Skinner 1945] C --> D[Operant Conditioning] C --> E[Private Events - within the skin] C --> F[Verbal Behaviour] D --> G[Reinforcement] D --> H[Punishment] D --> I[Extinction] D --> J[Shaping / Fading / Chaining] J --> K[FBA - Functional Behaviour Assessment] A --> L[Philosophical Critiques] L --> M[Armstrong - Identity Theory] L --> N[Putnam - X-worlder / Super-Spartans] N --> O[Functionalism replaces Behaviourism] A --> P[The Agent Problem] P --> Q[Foxall 2008 - Intentional Behaviourism] P --> R[Adaptive Radiation Analogy] C --> S[Molar vs Molecular] S --> T[Baum - Molar] S --> U[Rachlin - Teleological] S --> V[Skinner - Molecular] ``` --- ## Timeline (Mermaid) ```mermaid timeline title Key Dates in Behaviourism 1913 : Watson publishes "Psychology as the Behaviourist Views It" 1938 : Skinner - The Behavior of Organisms (operant conditioning) 1945 : Skinner - Radical Behaviourism named and defined 1957 : Skinner - Verbal Behavior 1959 : Chomsky's review of Verbal Behavior (major critique) 1963 : Putnam - Brains and Behavior (X-worlder argument) 1968 : Armstrong - A Materialist Theory of the Mind 1974 : Skinner - About Behaviorism 1994 : Rachlin - Behavior and Mind 2008 : Foxall - Intentional Behaviorism ``` --- ## Links & Related Notes - [[Operant Conditioning]] - [[Reinforcement Schedules]] - [[Functional Behaviour Assessment]] - [[Radical Behaviourism]] - [[Cognitive Revolution]] - [[Philosophy of Mind]] - [[Putnam - Functionalism]] - [[Armstrong - Identity Theory]] - [[Foxall 2008 - Intentional Behaviourism]] - [[Verbal Behaviour - Skinner]] - [[Molar vs Molecular Behaviour]] --- ## Key References - Armstrong, D.M. (1968). _A Materialist Theory of the Mind_. Routledge. - Baum, W.M. (2017). _Understanding Behaviorism_ (3rd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell. - Cooper, J.O., Heron, T.E., & Heward, W.L. (2020). _Applied Behavior Analysis_ (3rd ed.). Pearson. - Foxall, G.R. (2008). Intentional Behaviorism. _Behavior and Philosophy_, 36, 1–55. - Putnam, H. (1963). Brains and behavior. In R.J. Butler (Ed.), _Analytical Philosophy_ (2nd series). Blackwell. - Rachlin, H. (1994). _Behavior and Mind_. Oxford University Press. - Skinner, B.F. (1938). _The Behavior of Organisms_. Appleton-Century-Crofts. - Skinner, B.F. (1945). The operational analysis of psychological terms. _Psychological Review_, 52(4), 270–277. - Skinner, B.F. (1974). _About Behaviorism_. Knopf.